<p>Governments have enacted various legislative policies to stimulate Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) remanufacturing. In this study, we characterize both the carbon tax and take-back regulations to evaluate the effectiveness of hybrid legislative policies in promoting the remanufacturing of WEEE. By developing game-theoretic models under three different legislative policy scenarios, we derive a monopolistic OEM’s collection and production decisions. The economic, environmental and social performances are compared based on the derived equilibrium solutions. Our research reveals that for products with low carbon emissions from remanufacturing, a carbon tax policy without take-back regulations can effectively stimulate remanufacturing. For products with high carbon emissions from remanufacturing, however, well-designed take-back regulations are necessary to foster remanufacturing, as carbon tax policy alone does not provide sufficient incentive in these cases. Although stricter carbon tax and take-back regulations may reduce OEMs’ profitability and consumer surplus, they will always be more environmentally beneficial. The impact of legislative policies on social welfare is contingent upon the economic cost coefficient of environmental impact. When the economic factor is low, stricter legislation can increase total social welfare only if carbon emissions from remanufacturing are relatively low. Otherwise, social welfare may be reduced by stringent legislation policies. The findings have potential guidance for regulators to implement effective legislative policies to stimulate remanufacturing and promote sustainable development without unnecessary regulatory overlap or redundancy.</p>