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<p>The carbon–neutral transition of sewage treatment plants (STPs) is critical for achieving global sustainability goals. However, current STPs confront persistent financial and technical barriers, while Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) projects insufficiently integrate carbon reduction outcomes into their operational frameworks. This study develops a novel benefit allocation framework for carbon–neutral STP-ESCO partnerships by integrating carbon emission reduction metrics into a Rubinstein bargaining game model, which overcomes the “first-mover advantage” limitation in traditional models. Using a real-world STP photovoltaic project as a case study, we quantify the interdependencies between electricity selling prices, internal rates of return (IRR), and benefit distribution ratio. Key findings reveal that: (1) Cooperative feasibility exists only when electricity selling prices and benefit distribution ratios operate within Pareto-optimal thresholds, beyond which negotiations collapse. (2) Higher discount factors (patience levels) significantly reduce sensitivity to counter party parameter fluctuations, enabling stable profit-sharing even under asymmetric bargaining power. (3) Negotiations conclude faster when initial bargaining positions diverge sharply. These results highlight that embedding carbon incentives into EPC contracts and maintaining strategic patience are pivotal for aligning stakeholder interests. The study provides actionable guidance for designing equitable EPC contracts, formulating adaptive negotiation strategies, and advancing policy frameworks that prioritize carbon-inclusive benefit allocation. Its methodology and findings are applicable to other infrastructure sectors pursuing dual objectives of decarbonization and economic viability.</p>

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Energy performance contracting benefit distribution in solar-powered carbon neutrality sewage treatment plant

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月29日

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  • Yu Zhang,
  • Huimin Li,
  • Limin Su,
  • Yongchao Cao,
  • Wenjuan Zhang

摘要

The carbon–neutral transition of sewage treatment plants (STPs) is critical for achieving global sustainability goals. However, current STPs confront persistent financial and technical barriers, while Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) projects insufficiently integrate carbon reduction outcomes into their operational frameworks. This study develops a novel benefit allocation framework for carbon–neutral STP-ESCO partnerships by integrating carbon emission reduction metrics into a Rubinstein bargaining game model, which overcomes the “first-mover advantage” limitation in traditional models. Using a real-world STP photovoltaic project as a case study, we quantify the interdependencies between electricity selling prices, internal rates of return (IRR), and benefit distribution ratio. Key findings reveal that: (1) Cooperative feasibility exists only when electricity selling prices and benefit distribution ratios operate within Pareto-optimal thresholds, beyond which negotiations collapse. (2) Higher discount factors (patience levels) significantly reduce sensitivity to counter party parameter fluctuations, enabling stable profit-sharing even under asymmetric bargaining power. (3) Negotiations conclude faster when initial bargaining positions diverge sharply. These results highlight that embedding carbon incentives into EPC contracts and maintaining strategic patience are pivotal for aligning stakeholder interests. The study provides actionable guidance for designing equitable EPC contracts, formulating adaptive negotiation strategies, and advancing policy frameworks that prioritize carbon-inclusive benefit allocation. Its methodology and findings are applicable to other infrastructure sectors pursuing dual objectives of decarbonization and economic viability.