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<p>Given the transition problem for the after-sales service channel of Tesla and the emerging electric vehicle manufacturers (EVMs) in China, consider an electric vehicle (EV) supply chain consisting of an EVM and a reseller, we investigated the issue of after-sales service channel design by distinguishing a direct channel and four decentralized channels. In the direct channel, the EVM engages in production and sale of EVs and hires a third-party (3P) to undertake the after-sales service (i.e., EV-D-3P channel). In the decentralized channels, the after-sales service of EVs can be provided by the EVM (EV-M channel), reseller (EV-R channel), or the 3P hired by the EVM or reseller (EV-M-3P or EV-R-3P channel). We construct Stackelberg game models and examine the equilibrium solutions. It is shown that the after-sales service or the vehicle price may become the factor that significantly affects the demand of EVs under some conditions. It is also shown that the EVM and reseller have a conflict in the choice of after-sales service channels, and they prefer to undertake the service or hire the 3P by themselves, although EV-M channel generates the highest after-sales service level and the largest demand. Furthermore, the market demand of EVs is more sensitive to after-sale service level and the marginal after-sale service cost to increase after-sale service level is lower, the EVM prefers the reseller or a 3P (who possesses a lower after-sale service cost of EVs) to undertake the after-sales service.</p>

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Choice of after-sales service channels for electric vehicle supply chain with battery recycling: who is better off by engaging in after-sales service channels

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月18日

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  • Zhongwei Feng,
  • Wanting Zhao,
  • Wentao Yi,
  • Yuzhong Yang

摘要

Given the transition problem for the after-sales service channel of Tesla and the emerging electric vehicle manufacturers (EVMs) in China, consider an electric vehicle (EV) supply chain consisting of an EVM and a reseller, we investigated the issue of after-sales service channel design by distinguishing a direct channel and four decentralized channels. In the direct channel, the EVM engages in production and sale of EVs and hires a third-party (3P) to undertake the after-sales service (i.e., EV-D-3P channel). In the decentralized channels, the after-sales service of EVs can be provided by the EVM (EV-M channel), reseller (EV-R channel), or the 3P hired by the EVM or reseller (EV-M-3P or EV-R-3P channel). We construct Stackelberg game models and examine the equilibrium solutions. It is shown that the after-sales service or the vehicle price may become the factor that significantly affects the demand of EVs under some conditions. It is also shown that the EVM and reseller have a conflict in the choice of after-sales service channels, and they prefer to undertake the service or hire the 3P by themselves, although EV-M channel generates the highest after-sales service level and the largest demand. Furthermore, the market demand of EVs is more sensitive to after-sale service level and the marginal after-sale service cost to increase after-sale service level is lower, the EVM prefers the reseller or a 3P (who possesses a lower after-sale service cost of EVs) to undertake the after-sales service.