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<p>The "dual-control" policy on carbon emissions enforces stringent institutional constraints on power industry supply chain enterprises to ensure compliance with carbon emission reduction goals. Nevertheless, upstream and downstream firms pursuing private profit maximization in their emissions reduction decisions may lead to social welfare losses. This study reveals how cross-industry cooperation with power construction companies can overcome the profit-environment paradox through corporate social responsibility. The findings indicate that (1) the cross-sector coordination mechanism (cooperation with third-party firms) promotes a win–win situation for multiple parties and achieves Pareto improvement. When the carbon price rises from 80 RMB/ton to 120 RMB/ton, the cooperation raises the emission reduction rate to 50.38% and the supply chain profit increases by 20.36%. (2) The interaction effect between carbon price and investment scale is significant. For every 10 RMB/ton increase in carbon price, the marginal abatement efficiency increases by 8.35%, and the dynamic adjustment of investment scale can trigger a 50.73% elastic change in the abatement effect. (3) When the abatement cost-effectiveness sharing ratio is 0.5, the cooperation can obtain the optimal value of overall profit. (4) In terms of social welfare, cooperation performs optimally, with an increase of about 25% in both the abatement rate and social welfare. The corporate social responsibility concern offers a stable, positive gain for social welfare. At the same time, collaboration can be significantly enhanced by adjusting social concern in the high abatement cost-effectiveness sharing interval.</p>

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Cooperative Emission Reduction Decision-Making in the Electricity Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Game

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月16日

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  • Yue Zhang,
  • Xin-Gang Zhao,
  • Ying Zhou,
  • Xiao-yu Li

摘要

The "dual-control" policy on carbon emissions enforces stringent institutional constraints on power industry supply chain enterprises to ensure compliance with carbon emission reduction goals. Nevertheless, upstream and downstream firms pursuing private profit maximization in their emissions reduction decisions may lead to social welfare losses. This study reveals how cross-industry cooperation with power construction companies can overcome the profit-environment paradox through corporate social responsibility. The findings indicate that (1) the cross-sector coordination mechanism (cooperation with third-party firms) promotes a win–win situation for multiple parties and achieves Pareto improvement. When the carbon price rises from 80 RMB/ton to 120 RMB/ton, the cooperation raises the emission reduction rate to 50.38% and the supply chain profit increases by 20.36%. (2) The interaction effect between carbon price and investment scale is significant. For every 10 RMB/ton increase in carbon price, the marginal abatement efficiency increases by 8.35%, and the dynamic adjustment of investment scale can trigger a 50.73% elastic change in the abatement effect. (3) When the abatement cost-effectiveness sharing ratio is 0.5, the cooperation can obtain the optimal value of overall profit. (4) In terms of social welfare, cooperation performs optimally, with an increase of about 25% in both the abatement rate and social welfare. The corporate social responsibility concern offers a stable, positive gain for social welfare. At the same time, collaboration can be significantly enhanced by adjusting social concern in the high abatement cost-effectiveness sharing interval.