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<p>Prioritizing environmental sustainability is a key strategy for securing the health and prosperity of modern societies. In this paper, we study an environmental management problem known as the River Basin Pollution game, where multiple economic agents located along a river may contribute to pollution. An administrative authority seeks to enforce common environmental constraints on those competing industrial agents. To answer this problem, the RBP game is a static non-cooperative game, which allows to derive a Pigouvian tax scheme for the agents in practice. We propose a global sensitivity analysis of the proposed game across different types of equilibrium. In contrast to traditional comparative statics analysis, Sobol’ indices quantify the contribution of input parameters to the variability of resulting equilibria.</p>

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On the Use of Global Sensitivity Analysis in a Game-Theoretic Approach to an Environmental Management Problem

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月16日

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  • Christophe Dutang,
  • Clémentine Prieur

摘要

Prioritizing environmental sustainability is a key strategy for securing the health and prosperity of modern societies. In this paper, we study an environmental management problem known as the River Basin Pollution game, where multiple economic agents located along a river may contribute to pollution. An administrative authority seeks to enforce common environmental constraints on those competing industrial agents. To answer this problem, the RBP game is a static non-cooperative game, which allows to derive a Pigouvian tax scheme for the agents in practice. We propose a global sensitivity analysis of the proposed game across different types of equilibrium. In contrast to traditional comparative statics analysis, Sobol’ indices quantify the contribution of input parameters to the variability of resulting equilibria.