<p>The quality of products on reward-based crowdfunding platforms varies. Information asymmetry necessitates that project creators signal quality through persuasive advertising and pricing to maximize their profits. This study employs signaling game theory to model interactions between project creators and different types of consumers (sophisticated and naive). The equilibrium decisions and profits of creators are analyzed under various market conditions, such as advertising costs and consumer-related features. The findings reveal that the separating equilibrium where only the H-type creator advertises arises when the advertising cost of the L-type creator is relatively high and that of the H-type creator is relatively low. Conversely, when the advertising cost of the L-type creator is relatively low, the H-type cost exceeds a certain threshold, and the proportion of naive consumers is relatively high, the separating equilibrium where only the L-type creator advertises emerges. Relatively high or low advertising costs for both types lead to pooling equilibria, while intermediate advertising costs of the L-type creator lead to a semi-separating equilibrium. Moreover, the patterns of how creators’ prices and profits change with market conditions differ across equilibrium states. These findings provide guidance for creators in planning successful crowdfunding projects and optimizing product promotion strategies.</p>