<p>As manufacturers increasingly use live-streaming commerce, choosing between third-party logistics (3PL) and e-tailers’ proprietary logistics (ePL) is critical. This paper develops a game-theoretic model involving a manufacturer, an e-tailer, and a streamer, analyzing three scenarios: no live-streaming, live-streaming with 3PL, and live-streaming with ePL. We show that the manufacturer participates in live-streaming commerce only when the streamer’s slotting fee is low and logistics are sufficiently effective or cost-efficient. The logistics choice depends on a logistics index that captures the cost efficiency of ePL’s service advantage. A low index favors ePL; otherwise, 3PL is preferred. We identify a logistics-induced lock-in effect: when the quality advantage of ePL exceeds a threshold, the e-tailer may withhold logistics access, thereby discouraging the manufacturer’s live-streaming participation. A profit-sharing contract is proposed to overcome this inefficiency. Additionally, when the slotting fee is moderately high or the live-streaming platform’s commission rate is high, the streamer may lower its commission rate to encourage manufacturer participation in live-streaming sales. In the extension, we find a lower effort cost coefficient, typically driven by AI streamers, promotes the manufacturer’s adoption of live-streaming while simultaneously intensifying the lock-in effect.</p>