<p>Within the increasingly intensification of the market competition, platform gradually develop diversified operated channels to meet the varied market demands, mainly including agency selling and reselling channels. At the same time, information asymmetry affects bilateral users’ channel selection strategies, ultimately leading to competitive imbalances between channels. To explore the interactive game of platform’s information-sharing strategy and manufacturer’s channel choice, this study considers four scenarios: {reselling channel, information sharing}-RS, {agency selling channel, information sharing}-AS, {reselling channel, non-sharing information}-RN, {agency selling channel, non-sharing information}-AN. We first construct Bayesian models to derive the optimal results of static game, then develop the payoff to depict the multi-period game process, ultimately obtaining the equilibrium outcomes and preconditions. The results reveal several interesting phenomena: The speed of convergence between platform and manufacturer exhibits an axisymmetric relationship. There are ultimately two stable strategies: RS and AS that information sharing is always the stable strategy for platform. Under smaller identified demands, manufacturer first gradually switch into agency selling channel and then shifts into reselling channel with increasing selling cost, but under larger identified demands, manufacturer could gradually shift into agency reselling channel with rising selling cost. Our findings provide the suggestion for platform governance: First, platform should always share information to improve the efficiency effect of whole supply chain. Additionally, under smaller selling cost, platform can steer the manufacturer from the agency selling channel to reselling channel by increasing selling cost, while under larger selling cost, platform can conduct the manufacturer into reselling channel by lowering selling cost.</p>