<p>Online reviews play a crucial role in addressing patients’ concerns and guiding them toward online consultations in telemedicine. This study employs game-theoretic models to analyze how online reviews and public benefit influence the online channel strategies of medical institutions. We constructed three different channel structures: medical institutions providing offline services only (the offline model), establishing their own online channels (the self-built model), and cooperating with third-party platforms to provide online services (the cooperation model). Our analysis identifies the conditions under which medical institutions can successfully introduce online channels. Notably, even when online reviews reflect negative information, institutions can still increase profits by choosing the self-built channel, provided the degree of negativity is limited. Furthermore, the self-built model offers greater benefits to patients compared to the cooperation model. We also explore the interaction between online reviews and public benefit, providing strategic recommendations for institutions with high or low levels of public benefit. Finally, we demonstrate that opening online reviews in the online channel may not be profitable for public benefit medical institutions unless the proportion of positive reviews exceeds a certain threshold. These findings offer practical insights for medical institutions aiming to optimize their online channel strategies in the era of telemedicine.</p>