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<p>We examine the timing of timber harvesting, when neighboring forest stands interact through windthrow risk. Positive adjacency externality stems from the sheltering effect of tall trees whereas negative externality stems from a windthrow-prone border created by clear felling or wind damage. We model wind damages as catastrophic, which call for immediate salvage harvest and regeneration. We augment previous optimal rotation results by extending the analysis to a dynamic harvest policy, where harvest age depends on the age of the neighboring stand. We examine both an efficient equilibrium and an inefficient noncooperative Markov perfect equilibrium. In the efficient equilibrium, where the externality is internalized, harvest is delayed when the neighboring stand is mature. This delay provides shelter by postponing harvest-created border risks. In the noncooperative equilibrium, the shelter is not provided, yet the harvest age adapts to increased risk-levels due to the border effect. We numerically test the magnitude of the border effect under various model assumptions and find that pricing the carbon externality makes the harvest policy more responsive to the adjacency externality.</p>

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Adjacency Externality and the Timing of Timber Harvesting – The Case of Windthrow Risk

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月20日

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  • Jussi Lintunen,
  • Matti Hyyrynen,
  • Jonathan Holder,
  • Mikko Peltoniemi

摘要

We examine the timing of timber harvesting, when neighboring forest stands interact through windthrow risk. Positive adjacency externality stems from the sheltering effect of tall trees whereas negative externality stems from a windthrow-prone border created by clear felling or wind damage. We model wind damages as catastrophic, which call for immediate salvage harvest and regeneration. We augment previous optimal rotation results by extending the analysis to a dynamic harvest policy, where harvest age depends on the age of the neighboring stand. We examine both an efficient equilibrium and an inefficient noncooperative Markov perfect equilibrium. In the efficient equilibrium, where the externality is internalized, harvest is delayed when the neighboring stand is mature. This delay provides shelter by postponing harvest-created border risks. In the noncooperative equilibrium, the shelter is not provided, yet the harvest age adapts to increased risk-levels due to the border effect. We numerically test the magnitude of the border effect under various model assumptions and find that pricing the carbon externality makes the harvest policy more responsive to the adjacency externality.