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<p>Voluntary contributions to public goods have been shown to increase when contribution behaviors become observable by peers. We examine the effect of social pressure on moral behavior, using a framework distinguishing explicitly between observable and non-observable forms of contribution. We show that even with moral motivation and social pressure, there is underprovision of the public good. Making some contribution behaviors observable does increase effort, but also causes misallocation of effort between observable and non-observable effort types. The latter negative effect can possibly outweigh the positive effect of increased effort on public good provision.</p>

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The Mixed Effects of Making Contribution Behaviors Observable

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月26日

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  • Noel Zigrand Hoven,
  • Karine Nyborg

摘要

Voluntary contributions to public goods have been shown to increase when contribution behaviors become observable by peers. We examine the effect of social pressure on moral behavior, using a framework distinguishing explicitly between observable and non-observable forms of contribution. We show that even with moral motivation and social pressure, there is underprovision of the public good. Making some contribution behaviors observable does increase effort, but also causes misallocation of effort between observable and non-observable effort types. The latter negative effect can possibly outweigh the positive effect of increased effort on public good provision.