<p>This paper addresses the dynamic relationship between private investment and public investment by the federal government and by state and local governments in the United States. To isolate crowding in/out effects varying over time and across various frequencies, we employ continuous partial wavelet tools on quarterly data for total investment to GDP, as well as disaggregated investment in structures, equipment, and intellectual property products. The main results show under which fiscal and monetary scenarios such effects occur during recessionary and non-recessionary periods over more than seventy years. To summarize, there is a significant difference in results considering the short, mid, and long-term. The effects change over time, and they depend on the public player (federal government or state and local). Investments by type present very specific crowding in/out behavior, and private investment can anticipate public investment in the phasic and antiphasic directions. In terms of practical implications, the main findings reported here are helpful because now we know which are the specific circumstances in which public investments can mobilize private investments. In contrast, the displacement of private economic activity by public economic activity is expected under other circumstances identified here.</p>

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Crowding in or Crowding Out? a Time-Frequency Analysis of the Investment

  • Paulo Matos

摘要

This paper addresses the dynamic relationship between private investment and public investment by the federal government and by state and local governments in the United States. To isolate crowding in/out effects varying over time and across various frequencies, we employ continuous partial wavelet tools on quarterly data for total investment to GDP, as well as disaggregated investment in structures, equipment, and intellectual property products. The main results show under which fiscal and monetary scenarios such effects occur during recessionary and non-recessionary periods over more than seventy years. To summarize, there is a significant difference in results considering the short, mid, and long-term. The effects change over time, and they depend on the public player (federal government or state and local). Investments by type present very specific crowding in/out behavior, and private investment can anticipate public investment in the phasic and antiphasic directions. In terms of practical implications, the main findings reported here are helpful because now we know which are the specific circumstances in which public investments can mobilize private investments. In contrast, the displacement of private economic activity by public economic activity is expected under other circumstances identified here.