<p>Improving the effective supply of ecological products (ECP) is of great value for reducing carbon emissions and improving people’s ecological and environmental well-being. Based on the four-party evolutionary game model, this paper systematically analyzes the dynamic strategic interaction and evolution mechanism of government, social organizations, enterprises, and individuals in the supply of ECP. It also analyzes the strategic evolution path and behavioral stability of each subject in the process of social organization response, incentives on the supply side, and personal cognition under the situation of government differentiated supervision. Through model solving and numerical simulation, it is found that the government punishment mechanism and supervision intensity have a significant impact on the evolution of the system. Reasonable setting of these parameters can guide the system to converge to an efficient supply equilibrium. When the threshold value of government supervision intensity, denoted as p, is greater than about 0.2 and the individual ecological consciousness i is greater than about 0.1, the system can break out of the low-level equilibrium trap and converge to an effective equilibrium. Based on the above findings, this paper proposes incentive-compatible regulatory mechanism design and policy recommendations to enhance public participation, aiming to provide a theoretical basis and practical guidance for improving the efficiency of China’s ECP supply.</p>