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<p>The intelligent transformation of the vehicle industry represents a significant trend, with new energy vehicles (NEVs) serving as a pivotal platform for this transition. To analyze the dynamic interaction between the production strategy of manufacturer and the purchasing preference of consumer, two evolutionary game models were developed: a market-driven mechanism (MDM) and a government-guided mechanism (GGM). Empirical data from the 2022 Chinese vehicle market were used to validate the proposed models. The results identify intelligent deviation (the discrepancy between expected and actual intelligence levels) as a critical barrier to consumer adoption of NEV and a major contributor to market information asymmetry. Numerical simulations further demonstrate that: (1) Government intervention is essential, as subsidy ratios <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\phi \)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> below 0.1 and dual-credit incentives <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(S_E\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> below 1.5 fail to promote compliant production among manufacturers; (2) Decision-making behaviors are significantly influenced by the actual intelligence level <i>i</i>, the government’s regulatory disclosure capability <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\theta \)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, and consumer engagement in rights protection <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\lambda \)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>; (3) Under the GGM framework, the system evolves toward the ideal equilibrium of (Compliant Production, Purchase NEV), thereby effectively alleviating information asymmetry. These findings underscore the importance of well-calibrated policy instruments (such as dual-credit systems, subsidies, regulatory penalties, and mechanisms for consumer participation) in shaping strategic behaviors within the NEV market.</p>

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Mitigating Information Asymmetry in the Intelligent Transformation of New Energy Vehicles: An Evolutionary Game Approach

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月23日

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  • Yaoyao Hong,
  • Jingjing Tian,
  • Ning Sun,
  • Jiuchang Wei

摘要

The intelligent transformation of the vehicle industry represents a significant trend, with new energy vehicles (NEVs) serving as a pivotal platform for this transition. To analyze the dynamic interaction between the production strategy of manufacturer and the purchasing preference of consumer, two evolutionary game models were developed: a market-driven mechanism (MDM) and a government-guided mechanism (GGM). Empirical data from the 2022 Chinese vehicle market were used to validate the proposed models. The results identify intelligent deviation (the discrepancy between expected and actual intelligence levels) as a critical barrier to consumer adoption of NEV and a major contributor to market information asymmetry. Numerical simulations further demonstrate that: (1) Government intervention is essential, as subsidy ratios \(\phi \) below 0.1 and dual-credit incentives \(S_E\) below 1.5 fail to promote compliant production among manufacturers; (2) Decision-making behaviors are significantly influenced by the actual intelligence level i, the government’s regulatory disclosure capability \(\theta \) , and consumer engagement in rights protection \(\lambda \) ; (3) Under the GGM framework, the system evolves toward the ideal equilibrium of (Compliant Production, Purchase NEV), thereby effectively alleviating information asymmetry. These findings underscore the importance of well-calibrated policy instruments (such as dual-credit systems, subsidies, regulatory penalties, and mechanisms for consumer participation) in shaping strategic behaviors within the NEV market.