<p>A lack of accountability for activities commonly defined by criminologists as white-collar crimes has been a persistent theme in the literature for decades. Although this issue has long been recognized, over the past couple of decades, there has been a significant decline in enforcement activity, reflected not only in fewer regulatory actions but also in a substantial reduction in criminal prosecutions and other forms of governmental oversight intended to deter white-collar crimes. Drawing on Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse data as well as regulatory agency records on criminal and civil enforcement activity, budgets, and agency regulations, this paper documents a sharp decline in white-collar crime enforcement activity. Findings reveal a decades-long erosion in criminal enforcement, compounded by overburdened, understaffed, and underfunded regulatory agencies with little authority to fulfill their intended mandates. The result is a de facto regime of permission that enables white-collar criminals to pursue profits at all costs with virtual impunity.</p>