<p>Public spending and deficit fluctuations during electoral cycles have been the focus of increasing research in developed and emerging economies. Electorally driven fiscal expansions often lead to higher debt levels, sometimes necessitating engagement with International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs. These programs typically include conditions aimed at reducing budget deficits, and can limit the incumbent government’s ability to pursue expansionary fiscal policies ahead of elections. In this study, we employ an Intervention Analysis approach using monthly data to examine Albania’s budget deficit in the context of elections. We differentiate between elections held under active IMF programs and those conducted independently. Our findings reveal that budget deficits tend to rise before and during elections, with this increase being pronounced when elections occur without an IMF program. In contrast, elections held under active IMF oversight show no notable increase in deficits. The results are consistent across alternative specifications and estimation approaches. These findings contribute to the literature on Political Budget Cycles and offer valuable policy insights. Specifically, we find that supranational oversight, such as that provided by the IMF, can play a crucial role in mitigating election-driven debt surges – a critical issue for economies with high levels of public debt.</p>