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<p>We present a series of results from laboratory experiments that provide evidence that majority voting can have a causal effect on a group’s ability to overcome the free-rider problem in public goods games. We conduct three experiments in which the payoff of the public good is determined by majority voting or by the experimenter. We find that majority voting over the marginal per capita return (MPCR) results in higher contributions relative to when the MPCR is determined by the experimenter. Moreover, in a repeated game, we find that when participants engage in voting, we do not observe any “end-game effect” identified in other public goods experiments. In our final experiment, we randomly determine whether the outcome of the vote is implemented. We find that when the voting mechanism fails (i.e., the MPCR receiving the majority of votes is not implemented), the higher contributions associated with voting are not realized, with contributions being similar to the baseline (MPCR determined by the experimenter). The results of our experiments are consistent with the mechanism in which voting engenders a collective identity or a sense of ownership over the public good, thereby increasing the perceived cost of non-contribution.</p>

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Political institutions and cooperation: experimental evidence on the effects of voting

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月16日

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  • Ian Heffernan,
  • Robert Oxoby

摘要

We present a series of results from laboratory experiments that provide evidence that majority voting can have a causal effect on a group’s ability to overcome the free-rider problem in public goods games. We conduct three experiments in which the payoff of the public good is determined by majority voting or by the experimenter. We find that majority voting over the marginal per capita return (MPCR) results in higher contributions relative to when the MPCR is determined by the experimenter. Moreover, in a repeated game, we find that when participants engage in voting, we do not observe any “end-game effect” identified in other public goods experiments. In our final experiment, we randomly determine whether the outcome of the vote is implemented. We find that when the voting mechanism fails (i.e., the MPCR receiving the majority of votes is not implemented), the higher contributions associated with voting are not realized, with contributions being similar to the baseline (MPCR determined by the experimenter). The results of our experiments are consistent with the mechanism in which voting engenders a collective identity or a sense of ownership over the public good, thereby increasing the perceived cost of non-contribution.