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<p>Whether firm bribery exerts positive or negative effects on firm performance remains controversial. To reconcile this dispute, we differentiate between two types of firm bribery: prevention-focused bribery, which is used to get things done related to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, and services, and promotion-focused bribery, which is used to obtain preferential advantages such as government contracts. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, we hypothesize that prevention-focused bribery tends to have a negative effect on firm performance, whereas promotion-focused bribery is more likely to generate positive performance outcomes. Our hypotheses are tested using a comprehensive dataset covering 1465 firms across 30 transition economies. The findings reveal an important ethical dilemma: while certain forms of bribery may offer short-term benefits, they fundamentally violate deontological ethics, which advocates the unconditional prohibition of bribery and adherence to universal moral principles. Additionally, by demonstrating that the effectiveness of different types of bribery is contingent upon institutional quality, we suggest that anticorruption policies should prioritize improving the institutional quality of the business environment.</p>

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Protection Fee or Grease Money? The Opposing Effects of Prevention- and Promotion-Focused Bribery on Firm Performance

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月10日

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  • Zhexiong Tao,
  • Victor Cui,
  • Jiasi Fan,
  • Qianzhi Wei

摘要

Whether firm bribery exerts positive or negative effects on firm performance remains controversial. To reconcile this dispute, we differentiate between two types of firm bribery: prevention-focused bribery, which is used to get things done related to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, and services, and promotion-focused bribery, which is used to obtain preferential advantages such as government contracts. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, we hypothesize that prevention-focused bribery tends to have a negative effect on firm performance, whereas promotion-focused bribery is more likely to generate positive performance outcomes. Our hypotheses are tested using a comprehensive dataset covering 1465 firms across 30 transition economies. The findings reveal an important ethical dilemma: while certain forms of bribery may offer short-term benefits, they fundamentally violate deontological ethics, which advocates the unconditional prohibition of bribery and adherence to universal moral principles. Additionally, by demonstrating that the effectiveness of different types of bribery is contingent upon institutional quality, we suggest that anticorruption policies should prioritize improving the institutional quality of the business environment.