<p>Planetary degradation continues despite widely publicized eco-friendly behaviors of individual firms, creating a big disconnect. Drawing upon paradox theory, we examine the prevalence of both corporate compensatory action and environmental inaction after a firm commits environmental misdeeds. We argue that both limited compensatory actions and persistent inaction pose significant moral, economic, and system-level ecological implications. Next, based on insights from crisis management literature, we propose a multi-stage, sequential model to predict both the likelihood that a firm takes eco-friendly action after misdeeds and, if it does, the extent of these actions. In the first stage, we hypothesize that firm size, a proxy for visibility, positively moderates the likelihood of taking eco-friendly action to redirect negative attention after misdeeds. In the second stage, we hypothesize that smaller, more nimble firms have an implementation advantage, leading to a higher likelihood of more action after misdeeds. Based on 12,012 observations from the KLD sample of US-based firms between 2013 and 2019, inclusive, we find support for the big disconnect, since we find that inaction is the most common response after misdeeds. We also find that larger firms are more likely to have eco-friendly behaviors. And, for those firms who take action, smaller firms undertake more compensatory actions after environmental misdeeds. Persistent inaction and dispersed, small-scale compensatory actions can be problematic. Smaller firms may expend unnecessary resources and not get credit for disparate, eco-friendly activities. At the same time, larger firms may get more credit than deserved despite relatively limited actions. Collectively, inaction and dispersed compensatory action may not have sufficient impact to alter ecological degradation with subsequent intergenerational, irreversible harms. Nuanced practical and scholarly implications that curtail limited action while encouraging small firm experimentation are explored.</p>

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To Act or Not to Act: The Effects of Firm Size on Inaction, Eco-friendly, and Compensatory Actions

  • Jennifer J. Griffin,
  • Andrew Bryant,
  • Vanessa G. Perry

摘要

Planetary degradation continues despite widely publicized eco-friendly behaviors of individual firms, creating a big disconnect. Drawing upon paradox theory, we examine the prevalence of both corporate compensatory action and environmental inaction after a firm commits environmental misdeeds. We argue that both limited compensatory actions and persistent inaction pose significant moral, economic, and system-level ecological implications. Next, based on insights from crisis management literature, we propose a multi-stage, sequential model to predict both the likelihood that a firm takes eco-friendly action after misdeeds and, if it does, the extent of these actions. In the first stage, we hypothesize that firm size, a proxy for visibility, positively moderates the likelihood of taking eco-friendly action to redirect negative attention after misdeeds. In the second stage, we hypothesize that smaller, more nimble firms have an implementation advantage, leading to a higher likelihood of more action after misdeeds. Based on 12,012 observations from the KLD sample of US-based firms between 2013 and 2019, inclusive, we find support for the big disconnect, since we find that inaction is the most common response after misdeeds. We also find that larger firms are more likely to have eco-friendly behaviors. And, for those firms who take action, smaller firms undertake more compensatory actions after environmental misdeeds. Persistent inaction and dispersed, small-scale compensatory actions can be problematic. Smaller firms may expend unnecessary resources and not get credit for disparate, eco-friendly activities. At the same time, larger firms may get more credit than deserved despite relatively limited actions. Collectively, inaction and dispersed compensatory action may not have sufficient impact to alter ecological degradation with subsequent intergenerational, irreversible harms. Nuanced practical and scholarly implications that curtail limited action while encouraging small firm experimentation are explored.