<p>This study investigates how CEOs with prosocial preferences influence corporate tax avoidance. Using personal charitable donations as a proxy for prosocial preferences, we find that prosocial CEOs are associated with significantly higher effective tax rates, indicating lower levels of tax avoidance. To address potential endogeneity, we employ a difference-in-differences framework based on exogenous CEO turnover events, complemented by propensity score matching. Our analysis reveals that the effect of prosocial CEOs is most pronounced when they trust the government’s efficiency in resource allocation, when firms are subject to higher normative pressure, when tax avoidance exceeds shareholder expectations, and under conditions of heightened tax risk. Moreover, we demonstrate that by proactively reducing tax avoidance, prosocial CEOs benefit shareholders by increasing information transparency and lowering litigation risk. These findings highlight the influence of prosocial values in executive decision-making, promoting ethical business practices that benefit both shareholders and society.</p>