<p>Recent advances in neuroscience have introduced a wave of technologies and experimental paradigms aimed at studying animal behavior under more natural conditions. These approaches promise to reconcile the control of laboratory settings with the complexity of real-world environments. Although these methods, here collectively termed naturalistic neuroscience, are often regarded as groundbreaking, this paper critically assesses their conceptual underpinnings and methodological consequences. Specifically, I examine the assumptions held by proponents of what I call the ‘conventional framework’ of naturalistic neuroscience, who seek to more accurately capture animals’ true, unaltered behavior. By closely attending to experimental practices involving nonhuman animal models, I show how distinct theoretical assumptions shape what is meant by <i>naturalistic</i> and how these differences challenge an often-invoked ideal of methodological pluralism. I discourage treating naturalistic neuroscience as a unified enterprise, arguing that the conventional discourse obscures the diversity of scientific aims and practices, both fostering theoretical fragmentation and impeding efforts to unify the study of behavior.</p>