<p> <?tk 1?>Recent innovative research has focused on major transitions in cognitive evolution, drawing from the existing literature on major transitions in the evolution of life. This prompts a careful examination of the distinctions and similarities between these two types of transitions. In this paper, I present four claims. First, a theoretically fruitful approach to understanding major evolutionary transitions (METs) in life is to conceptualize them as a set of objectively similar events, akin to a natural kind concept. Second, this framework allows for discussing major cognitive transitions (MCTs) while emphasizing that METs and MCTs represent two distinct subsets of possibility-expanding evolutionary events, each defined by different criteria. Third, the recent works of Barron (Barron AB, Proc Biol Sci 290(2002):20230671) and Ginsburg and Jablonka (Ginsburg S, Jablonka E, Phil Trans r Soc B 376:201907662019, 2021) serve as successful examples of applying a transition-oriented approach to cognitive evolution. Both provide coherent definitions of MCTs along with fine-grained explanations of these events in unique ways. Finally, drawing on the tradition of dialectical thinking, specifically the method of climbing down the ladder of abstraction, I argue that their contributions can be viewed as complementary rather than competing alternatives.</p>