<p>This paper addresses a tension in <i>Sunni</i> philosophical theology. Scripture predicates that God is One. Saʿad al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī negates that God is a thing numbered and so excludes numerical quantity from the divine. The thesis is that this tension can be resolved without interpretive parameterisation by modelling theological inference as open and defeasible. The argument first sharpens the issue by treating "one" as a univocal numerical property, which yields an explicit contradiction between divine Oneness and non-numerability. It then uses Gödel’s incompleteness theorems methodologically to motivate restraint when deductive closure is demanded. From this meta lesson, I build a preferential consequence relation with a selection function that chooses the most theologically acceptable models. Models are ranked by Taftāzānī’s constraints of non-composition, non-quantification, and uniqueness of God. On this ranking, metaphysical unity is selected and numerical oneness is defeated. When residual inconsistency is forced, a paraconsistent closure blocks triviality while recovering classical reasoning for consistent premises. The conclusion is that the framework preserves divine transcendence, avoids logical overreach, and formalises the epistemic humility Taftāzānī recommends when reasoning meets paradox. It also explains why traditional readings prevail without stipulation and why theological inquiry can remain disciplined.</p>