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<p>Part of the business of argumentation theory involves resolving a conceptual dispute over what argumentation and argument are in the first place. This dispute has produced various “concepts of argument.” The goal of this paper is twofold: (1) to develop a complete ontology of argumentative phenomena, capable of accounting for various conceptions of argument—something, as I argue, that is badly wanting in argumentation theory; and, within this ontology, (2) to defend a position that there is but one concept of argument needed to grasp these diverse phenomena and conceptions of argument and argumentation. I move in four steps. First, I briefly sketch the discussion over arguments-as-activities and arguments-as-products. Second, I go back to the classic work of Twardowski on actions and products and adapt it for argumentation theory, producing a complex yet systematically organized conceptual ontology of argument and argumentation. This conceptual housekeeping allows me, third, to critically engage some of the recent, Frege-inspired philosophical literature on the concept of argument, while defending act-based approaches to argument(ation). Fourth, I present a positive proposal of a minimal, contrastivist concept of argument as <i>a set of reasons advanced to support a conclusion C</i><sub><i>1</i></sub><i> rather than another conclusion C</i><sub><i>n</i></sub>.</p>

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One Concept of Argument

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月14日

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  • Marcin Lewiński

摘要

Part of the business of argumentation theory involves resolving a conceptual dispute over what argumentation and argument are in the first place. This dispute has produced various “concepts of argument.” The goal of this paper is twofold: (1) to develop a complete ontology of argumentative phenomena, capable of accounting for various conceptions of argument—something, as I argue, that is badly wanting in argumentation theory; and, within this ontology, (2) to defend a position that there is but one concept of argument needed to grasp these diverse phenomena and conceptions of argument and argumentation. I move in four steps. First, I briefly sketch the discussion over arguments-as-activities and arguments-as-products. Second, I go back to the classic work of Twardowski on actions and products and adapt it for argumentation theory, producing a complex yet systematically organized conceptual ontology of argument and argumentation. This conceptual housekeeping allows me, third, to critically engage some of the recent, Frege-inspired philosophical literature on the concept of argument, while defending act-based approaches to argument(ation). Fourth, I present a positive proposal of a minimal, contrastivist concept of argument as a set of reasons advanced to support a conclusion C1 rather than another conclusion Cn.