<p>Our study focuses on the structural factors of the board to explain the type of actions taken in response to environmental discontinuities. Using the context of China’s Five-Year Plan adjustments, we examine how the overlap between the strategy and nomination committees influences firms’ strategic actions following industry deprioritization. Our findings indicate that firms with such committee overlap are more likely to appoint new directors, particularly those with previous experience on boards or strategy committees, and can do so more quickly. Furthermore, these firms are more likely to make strategic changes. We also find that the appointments of new experienced directors mediate the relationship between board committee overlap and strategic changes. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and are not driven by the potential endogenous appointment of overlapping directors. Finally, falsification tests, which examine the impact of the overlap between the nomination committee and the two other monitoring committees (compensation and audit committees), as well as supplemental tests conducted in the context of industry prioritization, provide us with further insights into the strategic function of the overlap between the strategy and nomination committees.</p>