<p>In a cooperative game with a coalition structure and augmenting system (CAS game), players within each priori union are restricted by an augmenting system. Some worths of coalitions (infeasible coalitions) are unknown, such as coalitions across multiple priori unions and certain sub-coalitions within each priori union. By regarding a CAS game as an incomplete information game, we evaluate unknown worths of infeasible coalitions through feasible coalitions, obtaining both the lower and upper worths of infeasible coalitions. Therefore, the interval Owen-augmenting value is proposed, which is an extension of the Owen value. By setting the Harsanyi dividends of unformed coalitions to zero, we introduce another value (i.e., the restricted Owen-augmenting value). Furthermore, we prove that the restricted Owen-augmenting value is a special case of the interval Owen-augmenting value. All proposed values can be used to solve a CAS game.</p>