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<p>This paper studies cooperative games where agents have multiple participation levels, and are embedded in a communication network. We introduce a solution concept that generalizes the Myerson value. It is constructed through a restriction operator that captures the interaction between the network structure and agents’ participation levels, and the way this interaction constrains feasible coalitions. The solution is axiomatically characterized and shown to satisfy a stability property. To demonstrate its applicability, we extend the classical sequencing problem to a setting where agents can exert effort to reduce processing times. Our solution then determines how the resulting cost savings are distributed when agents exert maximal effort and tasks are ordered in a cost-minimizing sequence.</p>

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A Myerson value for multi-choice games with a communication network

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月8日

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  • David Lowing,
  • Satoshi Nakada,
  • Serge Bertrand Nlend Oum,
  • Philippe Solal

摘要

This paper studies cooperative games where agents have multiple participation levels, and are embedded in a communication network. We introduce a solution concept that generalizes the Myerson value. It is constructed through a restriction operator that captures the interaction between the network structure and agents’ participation levels, and the way this interaction constrains feasible coalitions. The solution is axiomatically characterized and shown to satisfy a stability property. To demonstrate its applicability, we extend the classical sequencing problem to a setting where agents can exert effort to reduce processing times. Our solution then determines how the resulting cost savings are distributed when agents exert maximal effort and tasks are ordered in a cost-minimizing sequence.