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<p>Small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sellers on e-commerce platforms frequently face capital constraints and struggle to access traditional bank loans, making trade credit financing (TCF) and platform credit financing (PCF) critical alternatives. This study develops game-theoretic models for an e-commerce supply chain with a manufacturer, a capital-constrained retailer, and a platform to investigate the comparative efficiency of these two financing formats. Our analysis reveals that the retailer with zero initial capital exclusively prefers PCF, while the retailer with positive capital prefers PCF under high commission rates or moderate commission rates with high production costs; otherwise, TCF is preferred. Interestingly, we find that both the platform and the manufacturer are inclined to act as the financial provider rather than adopting a free-rider strategy, as long as neither the commission rate nor the wholesale price is too high. By modeling the strategic interaction among all members, we further identify the financing equilibria: TCF emerges as the stable outcome when the commission rate is low, or when it is moderate alongside a high wholesale price; conversely, PCF becomes the equilibrium when the commission rate is high, or when it is moderate alongside a low wholesale price. These results are driven by the interplay between the revenue recovery effect and the cost markup effect, which stem from structural differences between TCF and PCF. Moreover, from a systemic perspective, we demonstrate that both TCF and PCF can create value and partially coordinate the supply chain if the production cost is sufficiently low or the commission rate is sufficiently high, respectively. Furthermore, when considering that bank credit financing (BCF) is also available, we prove that BCF is not the preferred option for all supply chain members. Finally, extended analyses of more complex scenarios—where the manufacturer is also capital-constrained or the platform operates a competing reselling channel—confirm the robustness of our framework and provide additional insights into financing chain design and the impact of channel competition.</p>

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Strategic financing decisions in E-commerce supply chains: the battle of platform credit financing and trade credit financing

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月30日

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  • Wen-Hui Jiang,
  • Zhen-Song Chen,
  • Qiang Yang

摘要

Small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sellers on e-commerce platforms frequently face capital constraints and struggle to access traditional bank loans, making trade credit financing (TCF) and platform credit financing (PCF) critical alternatives. This study develops game-theoretic models for an e-commerce supply chain with a manufacturer, a capital-constrained retailer, and a platform to investigate the comparative efficiency of these two financing formats. Our analysis reveals that the retailer with zero initial capital exclusively prefers PCF, while the retailer with positive capital prefers PCF under high commission rates or moderate commission rates with high production costs; otherwise, TCF is preferred. Interestingly, we find that both the platform and the manufacturer are inclined to act as the financial provider rather than adopting a free-rider strategy, as long as neither the commission rate nor the wholesale price is too high. By modeling the strategic interaction among all members, we further identify the financing equilibria: TCF emerges as the stable outcome when the commission rate is low, or when it is moderate alongside a high wholesale price; conversely, PCF becomes the equilibrium when the commission rate is high, or when it is moderate alongside a low wholesale price. These results are driven by the interplay between the revenue recovery effect and the cost markup effect, which stem from structural differences between TCF and PCF. Moreover, from a systemic perspective, we demonstrate that both TCF and PCF can create value and partially coordinate the supply chain if the production cost is sufficiently low or the commission rate is sufficiently high, respectively. Furthermore, when considering that bank credit financing (BCF) is also available, we prove that BCF is not the preferred option for all supply chain members. Finally, extended analyses of more complex scenarios—where the manufacturer is also capital-constrained or the platform operates a competing reselling channel—confirm the robustness of our framework and provide additional insights into financing chain design and the impact of channel competition.