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<p>As supply chains become more complex and interdependent, knowledge emerges as a key resource in fostering collaboration among diverse entities. This study utilizes evolutionary game theory to explore the knowledge input behavior and its evolution law between the main manufacturer and suppliers for complex products, analyzing the factors that affect the knowledge input strategies of game subjects. A numerical simulation is carried out to assess how changes in parameters influence the outcomes of the evolution process. The results suggest that the probability of the game subjects adopting the knowledge input strategies is positively associated with the knowledge innovation coefficient and penalty coefficient, while it is negatively associated with the knowledge investment cost coefficient. Thresholds exist for the level of knowledge reserves and willingness to invest in knowledge on both sides. In response to the “free-riding” behavior in the development process of complex products, setting a reasonable penalty coefficient can help curb the opportunistic behavior of the main manufacturer and supplier.</p>

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Modeling knowledge dynamics in collaborative production systems: an evolutionary game approach to manufacturer-supplier input behavior

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月6日

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  • Zilong Wang,
  • Yuqi Yang

摘要

As supply chains become more complex and interdependent, knowledge emerges as a key resource in fostering collaboration among diverse entities. This study utilizes evolutionary game theory to explore the knowledge input behavior and its evolution law between the main manufacturer and suppliers for complex products, analyzing the factors that affect the knowledge input strategies of game subjects. A numerical simulation is carried out to assess how changes in parameters influence the outcomes of the evolution process. The results suggest that the probability of the game subjects adopting the knowledge input strategies is positively associated with the knowledge innovation coefficient and penalty coefficient, while it is negatively associated with the knowledge investment cost coefficient. Thresholds exist for the level of knowledge reserves and willingness to invest in knowledge on both sides. In response to the “free-riding” behavior in the development process of complex products, setting a reasonable penalty coefficient can help curb the opportunistic behavior of the main manufacturer and supplier.