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<p>At a macro level, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted global public health and national economies. Meeting the needs for essential commodities and relief materials has become increasingly challenging, as the effectiveness of one disaster management agency is contingent upon the actions of others. Thus, coordination is a crucial determining factor for the success of disaster management activities. However, the agencies involved have different objectives, resource constraints, and levels of control over decision parameters, making overall coordination a challenging task. To address this, we have&#xa0;considered a two-player game with local administrative bodies as the leaders and medical units as the followers for 26 European countries. We have developed non-cooperative game models where two players negotiate to exercise more control over the common resources. We have examined whether the designed game adheres to the basic assumptions for the existence of a Pareto optimal solution in a bi-level game. We have not assumed any predetermined level of bargaining power for either player and have enumerated the complete negotiation flowchart. We have studied how different equilibrium points in the flowchart influence the overall outcome as well as the players’ common and exclusive outputs. The results are compared with those of a centralized model as a standard benchmark to identify the cost of each of the equilibrium&#xa0;points. Efficient units are identified on a country-wise basis and potential improvements of inefficient units are determined, which also act as measures of course correction. The results and analysis have important implications for policymakers and disaster relief agencies.</p>

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Negotiation and coordination in combating covid pandemic: a bi-level DEA game perspective

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月12日

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  • Utsav Pandey,
  • Sanjeet Singh

摘要

At a macro level, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted global public health and national economies. Meeting the needs for essential commodities and relief materials has become increasingly challenging, as the effectiveness of one disaster management agency is contingent upon the actions of others. Thus, coordination is a crucial determining factor for the success of disaster management activities. However, the agencies involved have different objectives, resource constraints, and levels of control over decision parameters, making overall coordination a challenging task. To address this, we have considered a two-player game with local administrative bodies as the leaders and medical units as the followers for 26 European countries. We have developed non-cooperative game models where two players negotiate to exercise more control over the common resources. We have examined whether the designed game adheres to the basic assumptions for the existence of a Pareto optimal solution in a bi-level game. We have not assumed any predetermined level of bargaining power for either player and have enumerated the complete negotiation flowchart. We have studied how different equilibrium points in the flowchart influence the overall outcome as well as the players’ common and exclusive outputs. The results are compared with those of a centralized model as a standard benchmark to identify the cost of each of the equilibrium points. Efficient units are identified on a country-wise basis and potential improvements of inefficient units are determined, which also act as measures of course correction. The results and analysis have important implications for policymakers and disaster relief agencies.