<p>When dominant retailers with strong bargaining power impose personalized pricing, it can further erode suppliers’ margins. Suppliers may choose to introduce different types of fringe retailers to compete with them. We develop a game model to study whether the supplier should use a traditional fringe retailer (implementing uniform pricing) or digital fringe retailer (implementing personalized pricing) against the dominant retailer and how price competition, consumer surplus, and social welfare are affected in different scenarios. Additionally, this paper explores the connection between personalized pricing and retailers’ big data capability, examining its impact. Our analysis suggests that the supplier will choose a digital fringe retailer with low big data capability, as they can benefit from the fringe retailer’s personalized pricing implementation. Conversely, if the fringe retailer has high big data capability, both the supplier and retailers will benefit from choosing to bring in a traditional fringe retailer. This is because as the big data capability increases, price competition between retailers becomes more intense, and double marginalization decreases. Interestingly, this also allows consumers to benefit more from the introduction of the digital fringe retailer. In addition, when consumers have different valuation for the dominant retailer and the fringe retailer, the choice of the supplier will be a little different. Our research provides strategic options for suppliers to counter dominant retailer suppression and enriches personalized pricing theory.</p>