<p>When platforms purchase products from manufacturers, they may carry strategic inventory in practice. That is, platforms buy excess goods in the initial phase and store them to serve demand later. This paper analytically explores the platform and manufacturer’s equilibrium decisions, supply chain coordination, and platform mode preferences without and with strategic inventory under a regional cap-and-trade scheme. First, without strategic inventory, increasing emissions intensity raises the optimal retail prices in both modes. Higher platform-enabled power lowers agency mode’s retail price at a small cost coefficient of implementing green technology (CCGT). Second, with strategic inventory, the emissions intensity has a negative influence on the equilibrium retail prices in both periods when CCGT is low. Platform-enabled power has a detrimental influence on the equilibrium second-period wholesale price when CCGT is low. Third, without strategic inventory, the agency mode allows the manufacturer to earn less (more) profit at a high (low) emissions intensity as opposed to the reseller mode. However, strategic inventory benefits the manufacturer more from the reseller mode than the agency and reseller modes without strategic inventory. Finally, without and with strategic inventory, the two enterprises under the reseller mode are able to accomplish coordination. The findings are further illustrated by numerical studies, which show that after coordination, the two firms’ aggregate profit without (with) strategic inventory in the reseller mode can be increased by over 24% (41%). Overall, these findings not only shed light on the theory of platform operations but also offer a reasonable explanation for the existence of strategic inventory.</p>