<p>How to manage the non-dividend behavior of state-owned enterprises is not only a key part of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors, but also an inevitable requirement for implementing the mandatory dividend policy and deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises in transitional economies. This paper takes China as representative of transitional economies, discusses the impact of mixed ownership reform on the dividend behavior of state-owned enterprises from the two dimensions of shareholding ratio and appointed executives, and manually collects data on the nature, shareholding ratio and appointed executives of the top ten shareholders disclosed in the annual reports. The empirical findings are as follows: (1) Appointing executives to state-owned enterprises by non-state-owned shareholders can significantly enhance the cash dividend level of state-owned enterprises, while simply increasing the shareholding ratio of non-state-owned shareholders has no significant effect on the dividend level of state-owned enterprises. (2) After local governments launch debt governance actions, the role of mixed ownership reform in improving the dividend level of state-owned enterprises has weakened. (3) In regions with high marketization level and media attention, local government debt governance has a particularly significant negative moderating effect on the positive correlation between mixed ownership reform and the dividend level of state-owned enterprises. This paper will not only better promote the implementation of various policies of the reform of state-owned enterprises to obtain the best implementation efficiency, but also provide more beneficial enlightenment for the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors in transitional economies.</p>