<p>How do US allies respond when security dependence on Washington collides with deep economic exposure to China? This article argues that renewed US protectionism has intensified an alliance dilemma that does not produce uniform alignment, but differentiated forms of hedging. Rather than choosing sides, allies seek to manage simultaneous risks: security abandonment by the USA, economic disruption from decoupling, and vulnerability to coercion from both Washington and Beijing. Building on the hedging literature, the article develops a framework to explain variation in allied hedging across three dimensions: security dependence on the USA, economic exposure to China, and institutional capacity for autonomous adjustment. It identifies three ideal-typical responses: institutional hedging, functional hedging, and diversification hedging. Through comparative analysis of the European Union, Japan, South Korea, the UK, Australia, and Canada, the article shows that US protectionism does not eliminate hedging; instead, it reshapes its form. The findings suggest that allied hedging has become more institutionalized, more issue-specific, and more closely tied to economic resilience and supply-chain governance. This trend does not imply alliance breakdown, but it does indicate growing fragmentation within the US-led order and a weakening of institutional trust among allies.</p>