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<p>This paper investigates the role of sectarian identities in explaining preferences over income redistribution in Lebanon and addresses this question: why do the poor not expropriate the rich in Lebanon? Moreover, this paper employs Acemoglu and Robinson’ game theoretic redistribution model, with a focus on sectarian identities in addition to class. We examine the impact of these identity affiliations on preferences over income redistribution, while emphasizing the role of inequality in shaping those preferences. We show that low-income groups, when they have strong religious affiliations, are inclined to choose a low redistribution level that benefits their religious group, at the expense of their class interests. Conversely, when sectarian weights diminish, the model reverts to the class benchmark, and the poor choose higher level of redistribution. The model is used to explain phases of conflict, settlement, and redistribution in Lebanon in its recent history.</p>

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A model of religious identities and income redistribution: from the Lebanese Civil War to the Taif Agreement

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月20日

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  • Ghassan Dibeh,
  • Stephanie Karam

摘要

This paper investigates the role of sectarian identities in explaining preferences over income redistribution in Lebanon and addresses this question: why do the poor not expropriate the rich in Lebanon? Moreover, this paper employs Acemoglu and Robinson’ game theoretic redistribution model, with a focus on sectarian identities in addition to class. We examine the impact of these identity affiliations on preferences over income redistribution, while emphasizing the role of inequality in shaping those preferences. We show that low-income groups, when they have strong religious affiliations, are inclined to choose a low redistribution level that benefits their religious group, at the expense of their class interests. Conversely, when sectarian weights diminish, the model reverts to the class benchmark, and the poor choose higher level of redistribution. The model is used to explain phases of conflict, settlement, and redistribution in Lebanon in its recent history.