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<p>This paper offers a cooperative game-theoretic analysis of a proposed Deposit Refund System (DRS) in the Czech Republic, based on real data from the beverage and beer sector. The model includes three key stakeholders—Manufacturer, Retailer, and Recycler—within a realistic market structure where Retailers act as Stackelberg leaders. Coalition values are derived from a Stackelberg game and reflect real operational and regulatory constraints. We compare four cooperative solution concepts: Shapley Value, Kernel, Nucleolus, and Equal Satisfaction Method (ESM). Results show a narrow but non-empty core, with Shapley and Kernel nearly identical, indicating alignment between contribution-based fairness and power-balanced stability. The Nucleolus favors the Manufacturer due to its regulatory burden, while ESM lies on the core boundary in both DRS and non-DRS scenarios-proving that satisfaction-based fairness is feasible. The introduction of a DRS governed by a non-profit organization slightly expands the core and improves the Recycler’s position. This analysis provides clear policy insights on how institutional design can support stable, fair cost-sharing in real-world environmental regulation.</p>

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Fairness and stability in deposit-refund systems in the Czech Republic

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月29日

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  • Petr Pokorny,
  • Petr Fiala

摘要

This paper offers a cooperative game-theoretic analysis of a proposed Deposit Refund System (DRS) in the Czech Republic, based on real data from the beverage and beer sector. The model includes three key stakeholders—Manufacturer, Retailer, and Recycler—within a realistic market structure where Retailers act as Stackelberg leaders. Coalition values are derived from a Stackelberg game and reflect real operational and regulatory constraints. We compare four cooperative solution concepts: Shapley Value, Kernel, Nucleolus, and Equal Satisfaction Method (ESM). Results show a narrow but non-empty core, with Shapley and Kernel nearly identical, indicating alignment between contribution-based fairness and power-balanced stability. The Nucleolus favors the Manufacturer due to its regulatory burden, while ESM lies on the core boundary in both DRS and non-DRS scenarios-proving that satisfaction-based fairness is feasible. The introduction of a DRS governed by a non-profit organization slightly expands the core and improves the Recycler’s position. This analysis provides clear policy insights on how institutional design can support stable, fair cost-sharing in real-world environmental regulation.