<p>In the context of digitalization and greening, traditional manufacturers must not only face the constraints of low-carbon policies, but also consider digital transformation (DT) to improve their competitiveness. This paper aims to clarify the relationship between the carbon cap-and-trade policy and manufacturers’ DT, explore the impact of this policy on manufacturers’ DT, and further discuss the impact of manufacturers’ DT on carbon emissions. Therefore, this paper first presents the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of two manufacturers’ DT through evolutionary game theory under the carbon cap-and-trade policy and then examines how the policy influences manufacturers’ ESS. The results show that changing the manufacturers’ carbon quota will not affect their DT strategy. However, when the ratio of the degree of DT of the two manufacturers and the size of the carbon reduction coefficient meet certain conditions, changes in carbon trading prices can promote manufacturers to implement DT. Additionally, the impact of DT on total carbon emissions is uncertain. It depends on the ratio of the demand expansion coefficient and cost-saving coefficient, as well as the effects of carbon reduction coefficient.</p> Graphical Abstract <p></p>

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Can carbon cap-and-trade policy promote digital transformation of manufacturers? An evolutionary game analysis

  • Anhang Chen,
  • Huiqin Zhang,
  • Jiaman Yu,
  • Yuxiang Zhang

摘要

In the context of digitalization and greening, traditional manufacturers must not only face the constraints of low-carbon policies, but also consider digital transformation (DT) to improve their competitiveness. This paper aims to clarify the relationship between the carbon cap-and-trade policy and manufacturers’ DT, explore the impact of this policy on manufacturers’ DT, and further discuss the impact of manufacturers’ DT on carbon emissions. Therefore, this paper first presents the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of two manufacturers’ DT through evolutionary game theory under the carbon cap-and-trade policy and then examines how the policy influences manufacturers’ ESS. The results show that changing the manufacturers’ carbon quota will not affect their DT strategy. However, when the ratio of the degree of DT of the two manufacturers and the size of the carbon reduction coefficient meet certain conditions, changes in carbon trading prices can promote manufacturers to implement DT. Additionally, the impact of DT on total carbon emissions is uncertain. It depends on the ratio of the demand expansion coefficient and cost-saving coefficient, as well as the effects of carbon reduction coefficient.

Graphical Abstract