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<p>In this paper, we investigate the implementation problem that arises when the designer is uncertain about the agents’ rationality. We discuss double implementation in Nash and <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\varepsilon\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi>ε</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-Nash equilibria.&#xa0;We fully characterize the social choice rules which can be doubly implemented in Nash and ε-Nash equilibria.</p>

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Nash and Epsilon-Nash implementation

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月16日

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  • Jianxin Yi

摘要

In this paper, we investigate the implementation problem that arises when the designer is uncertain about the agents’ rationality. We discuss double implementation in Nash and \(\varepsilon\) ε -Nash equilibria. We fully characterize the social choice rules which can be doubly implemented in Nash and ε-Nash equilibria.