Scholarlink

<p>Research on managerial delegation typically suggests that firms in a Cournot duopoly compete more aggressively in the product market post-delegation, causing their profits to decline. This paper investigates the profitability of delegation by incorporating a sales-delegation strategy into a spatial barbell model, where consumers are asymmetrically distributed at the two endpoints of a line segment. We find that the firm located closer to the more populated market may benefit from delegation. Notably, this occurs when the locational equilibrium shifts from agglomeration to separation following delegation. Although the firms compete more intensely under delegation, social welfare decreases when the locational equilibrium changes from separation to agglomeration and the transport rate is sufficiently high.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

The profitability of managerial delegation with endogenous locations

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月16日

查看全文
  • Dang-Long Bui,
  • Wen-Jung Liang,
  • Yan-Shu Lin

摘要

Research on managerial delegation typically suggests that firms in a Cournot duopoly compete more aggressively in the product market post-delegation, causing their profits to decline. This paper investigates the profitability of delegation by incorporating a sales-delegation strategy into a spatial barbell model, where consumers are asymmetrically distributed at the two endpoints of a line segment. We find that the firm located closer to the more populated market may benefit from delegation. Notably, this occurs when the locational equilibrium shifts from agglomeration to separation following delegation. Although the firms compete more intensely under delegation, social welfare decreases when the locational equilibrium changes from separation to agglomeration and the transport rate is sufficiently high.