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<p>We study matching markets in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value specific to each woman. We introduce a new class of procedures, which is a novel way of studying the deferred acceptance mechanism. These procedures can be replicated by another procedure, in which a woman proposes to a random man in each step. Envy in a matching market is bounded by envy in this class of procedures, in which there is just one woman and two types of men. In large markets, envy goes to zero; moreover, the deferred acceptance mechanism is approximately strategy-proof.</p>

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A limit to envy in large matching markets with incomplete information

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月21日

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  • Behrang Kamali Shahdadi,
  • Kourosh Khounsari

摘要

We study matching markets in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value specific to each woman. We introduce a new class of procedures, which is a novel way of studying the deferred acceptance mechanism. These procedures can be replicated by another procedure, in which a woman proposes to a random man in each step. Envy in a matching market is bounded by envy in this class of procedures, in which there is just one woman and two types of men. In large markets, envy goes to zero; moreover, the deferred acceptance mechanism is approximately strategy-proof.