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<p>We study the perfect-information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients — an informed trader and an uninformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.</p>

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Nash equilibrium between brokers and traders

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月27日

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  • Álvaro Cartea,
  • Sebastian Jaimungal,
  • Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt

摘要

We study the perfect-information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients — an informed trader and an uninformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.