The optimization of incentive mechanisms for edge federated learning based on Stackelberg game
摘要
Edge Federated Learning (EFL), formed by integrating edge computing and federated learning, faces constraints from resource heterogeneity and unequal benefit distribution. This study constructs a dynamic incentive mechanism optimization framework based on Stackelberg game theory. The framework regulates edge node behavior through a leader–follower game model, dynamic reward and punishment strategies, and an improved Game-based Incentive Mechanism Algorithm (GIMA) (defined as a game-theoretic iterative optimization algorithm for incentive strategy adaptation in heterogeneous edge environments). Simulations using classical datasets including MNIST, CIFAR-10, IMDB, and Human Activity Recognition (HAR) verify its effectiveness. In the scenario with 100 heterogeneous edge nodes, the node participation rate reaches 89.3% ± 2.3, the number of model convergence rounds decreases by 40.5% ± 3.1, the incentive cost reduces by 25.8% ± 2.7, and the test accuracy remains at 91.8% ± 0.7. Even under dynamic node exit with a 20% exit rate or extreme heterogeneity with a variance of 0.5, the mechanism maintains over 79% node participation. It also balances privacy protection and system efficiency, achieving 82.1% participation when the differential privacy budget ε is 0.1. Under the experimental conditions of this study, the proposed mechanism helps improve node participation, shorten training cycles, and reduce resource consumption for EFL systems.