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<p>Tournaments are well studied objects in economic theory. Copeland (<CitationRef CitationID="CR6">1951</CitationRef>) provides an intuitive way to select alternatives from a tournament, the <i>Copeland set</i>. As a tournament solution, the Copeland set possesses many desirable properties and has been widely studied. Rubinstein (<CitationRef CitationID="CR12">1980</CitationRef>) axiomatizes a method to rank alternatives from a tournament which is based on their <i>Copeland scores</i>. This paper analyzes the Copeland set from a revealed preference perspective. A choice procedure where a decision maker has a fixed underlying tournament and selects the Copeland set from every menu is behaviorally characterized.</p>

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Copeland choice rules

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月20日

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  • Bhavook Bhardwaj,
  • Kriti Manocha

摘要

Tournaments are well studied objects in economic theory. Copeland (1951) provides an intuitive way to select alternatives from a tournament, the Copeland set. As a tournament solution, the Copeland set possesses many desirable properties and has been widely studied. Rubinstein (1980) axiomatizes a method to rank alternatives from a tournament which is based on their Copeland scores. This paper analyzes the Copeland set from a revealed preference perspective. A choice procedure where a decision maker has a fixed underlying tournament and selects the Copeland set from every menu is behaviorally characterized.