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<p>We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting–outperforming any other known mechanism in the literature–this rate converges to zero in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game as the market size grows. Second, we show there exists a Nash equilibrium where the average student receives a dramatically inferior assignment: in markets with 1,000 students, the average placement shifts from the 7th choice (under truthfulness) to the 145th choice, representing a change from logarithmic to nearly linear average rank.</p>

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A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月5日

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  • Josué Ortega

摘要

We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting–outperforming any other known mechanism in the literature–this rate converges to zero in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game as the market size grows. Second, we show there exists a Nash equilibrium where the average student receives a dramatically inferior assignment: in markets with 1,000 students, the average placement shifts from the 7th choice (under truthfulness) to the 145th choice, representing a change from logarithmic to nearly linear average rank.