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<p>We consider a model where two agents, who own different shares of a resource, need to dissolve their partnerships efficiently. Both the agents have loss averse preferences (Tversky and Kahneman in Q J Econ 106:1039–1061, 1991; K<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\ddot{\text {o}}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mover accent="true"> <mi mathvariant="normal">o</mi> <mo>¨</mo> </mover> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>szegi and Rabin in Q J Econ 121(121):1133–1165, 2006; K<InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\ddot{\text {o}}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mover accent="true"> <mi mathvariant="normal">o</mi> <mo>¨</mo> </mover> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>szegi and Rabin in Am Econ Rev 97(97):1047–1073, 2007). The efficiency is defined such that the ex-post sum of material valuations and gain–loss utilities is maximized. We show that no feasible, efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism exists in this model.</p>

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Dissolving a bilateral partnership

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月17日

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  • Harshika Dalakoti

摘要

We consider a model where two agents, who own different shares of a resource, need to dissolve their partnerships efficiently. Both the agents have loss averse preferences (Tversky and Kahneman in Q J Econ 106:1039–1061, 1991; K \(\ddot{\text {o}}\) o ¨ szegi and Rabin in Q J Econ 121(121):1133–1165, 2006; K \(\ddot{\text {o}}\) o ¨ szegi and Rabin in Am Econ Rev 97(97):1047–1073, 2007). The efficiency is defined such that the ex-post sum of material valuations and gain–loss utilities is maximized. We show that no feasible, efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism exists in this model.