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<p>This paper provides a non-cooperative bargaining approach to analyze games with coalitional externalities. Four well-studied solution concepts for partition function form games are implemented: the externality-free value (Pham Do and Norde in Int Game Theory Rev 9:353–360, 2007; de Clippel and Serrano in Econometrica 76:1413–1436, 2008), the expected stand-alone value and the consensus value (Ju in Int Game Theory Rev 9:437–452, 2007) and the extended Shapley value (McQuillin in J Econ Theory 144:696–721, 2009). We generalize the bidding mechanism introduced in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) to partition function form games. Using these generalizations provides a coherent and structured framework to study strategic aspects of different normative approaches.</p>

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Bidding with coalitional externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月21日

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  • Yuan Ju,
  • David Wettstein

摘要

This paper provides a non-cooperative bargaining approach to analyze games with coalitional externalities. Four well-studied solution concepts for partition function form games are implemented: the externality-free value (Pham Do and Norde in Int Game Theory Rev 9:353–360, 2007; de Clippel and Serrano in Econometrica 76:1413–1436, 2008), the expected stand-alone value and the consensus value (Ju in Int Game Theory Rev 9:437–452, 2007) and the extended Shapley value (McQuillin in J Econ Theory 144:696–721, 2009). We generalize the bidding mechanism introduced in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) to partition function form games. Using these generalizations provides a coherent and structured framework to study strategic aspects of different normative approaches.