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<p>We build a model of policymaking under the threat of unrest. A policymaker chooses how much effort to spend on a public good; effort is unobservable and the outcome conditional on effort is uncertain. A group of citizens protest if the outcome falls short of a reference point; the reference point is determined endogenously by expectations about the outcome and by the intensity of emotions. We show that the effects of stronger emotional reactions on policymaker’s effort and the probability of protest are nonmonotonic and depend on the group’s ability to inflict damage. Equilibrium may require the policymaker to randomize between providing some effort or no effort at all, in order to temper citizens’ expectations, in which case strong emotional reactions are counterproductive. Optimal emotional reactions are fine-tuned to minimize the probability of protest.</p>

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Why Do People Protest? A Theory of Emotions, Public Policy, and Political Unrest

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月19日

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  • César Martinelli,
  • Ruolong Xiao

摘要

We build a model of policymaking under the threat of unrest. A policymaker chooses how much effort to spend on a public good; effort is unobservable and the outcome conditional on effort is uncertain. A group of citizens protest if the outcome falls short of a reference point; the reference point is determined endogenously by expectations about the outcome and by the intensity of emotions. We show that the effects of stronger emotional reactions on policymaker’s effort and the probability of protest are nonmonotonic and depend on the group’s ability to inflict damage. Equilibrium may require the policymaker to randomize between providing some effort or no effort at all, in order to temper citizens’ expectations, in which case strong emotional reactions are counterproductive. Optimal emotional reactions are fine-tuned to minimize the probability of protest.