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<p>This paper examines the rationalizability of two-sided aggregate matchings with non-transferable utility under single-peaked preferences. We build upon Echenique et al. (Econometrica <b>81</b>:153–171, 2013), which considers unrestricted preference domains. In contrast, we restrict preferences to be single-peaked, motivated by the fact that many observable characteristics of agents, such as age and income, are naturally ordered. A matching is rationalizable by single-peaked preferences if there exists a single-peaked preference profile under which the observed matching is stable. We find a characterization for such matchings and extend the result to a multidimensional type setting.</p>

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Revealed preference tests of stability in aggregate matching with single-peaked preferences

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月13日

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  • Tina D. Zhang,
  • Andrés Carvajal

摘要

This paper examines the rationalizability of two-sided aggregate matchings with non-transferable utility under single-peaked preferences. We build upon Echenique et al. (Econometrica 81:153–171, 2013), which considers unrestricted preference domains. In contrast, we restrict preferences to be single-peaked, motivated by the fact that many observable characteristics of agents, such as age and income, are naturally ordered. A matching is rationalizable by single-peaked preferences if there exists a single-peaked preference profile under which the observed matching is stable. We find a characterization for such matchings and extend the result to a multidimensional type setting.