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<p>We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, preceded by a round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that individuals are largely truthful (about 80% overall) in revealing their types in both one-way and two-way cheap talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when the players fully reveal their information. However, they attain even higher payoffs in the game with one-way talk by choosing the desired coordinated outcome following truthful announcements, which deviates from the theoretical equilibrium.</p>

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Communicating in a coordination game with private information

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月17日

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  • Antonio Cabrales,
  • Michalis Drouvelis,
  • Zeynep Gürgüç,
  • Indrajit Ray

摘要

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, preceded by a round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that individuals are largely truthful (about 80% overall) in revealing their types in both one-way and two-way cheap talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when the players fully reveal their information. However, they attain even higher payoffs in the game with one-way talk by choosing the desired coordinated outcome following truthful announcements, which deviates from the theoretical equilibrium.