Scholarlink

<p>How can the West’s economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from the majority position despite centripetal forces that induce interest groups to select positions closer to that majority position. Resources, organization, and cognitive biases can induce one-sided outcomes. When we allow for long-term lobbying infrastructure investments in a simplified tax-and-spend model, the deviations between majority desires and implemented policies are even larger than those in the absence of long-term investments.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Investing in influence: how minority interests can prevail in a democracy

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月7日

查看全文
  • Stergios Skaperdas,
  • Samarth Vaidya

摘要

How can the West’s economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from the majority position despite centripetal forces that induce interest groups to select positions closer to that majority position. Resources, organization, and cognitive biases can induce one-sided outcomes. When we allow for long-term lobbying infrastructure investments in a simplified tax-and-spend model, the deviations between majority desires and implemented policies are even larger than those in the absence of long-term investments.